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Mr. Benn reprints the original chapter on Socrates, merely adding a note in criticism of some recent work. The chapter on the metaphysics of Plato is in great part new, but Mr. Benn's general point of view remains the same. Mr. Benn's views on Socrates and Plato do not commend themselves to everybody; but he has the courage of his convictions and believes that they can be defended against all criticism. Very valuable is the scholarly note on the idea of Nature in Plato. It emphasises the fact, often overlooked, that Plato did have an interest in the physical aspect of the world, and also that the doctrine of *φύσις* has a close connection with Plato's general conception of reality. The value of the note might have been enhanced if the relation of the theory of nature to the doctrine of forms had been brought out.

In the remaining chapters of the book, Mr. Benn deals with Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus and Lucretius, the Sceptics and Eclectics, and Plotinus. These chapters have been reprinted with hardly any change, and it is unnecessary to say anything of them except that they display specially clearly the merits of the book. On the whole, Mr. Benn has been very successful in realising his ambitious aim, "To exhibit the principal ideas of Greek philosophy in the closest possible connection with the characters of their authors, with each other, with the parallel tendencies of literature and art, with the history of religion, of physical science, and of civilisation as a whole."

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WILLIAM JAMES AND HENRI BERGSON. By Horace Meyer Kallen, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. Pp. xi, 248. \$1.50.

This brilliantly written little volume is a timely and able discussion of some questions that have needed sifting ever since James' rhapsodic introduction of Bergson to English readers. By many, even among the initiated, that famous introduction has been taken for much more than it was worth as an index of the agreement between James and Bergson. It is well, therefore, to have these matters set out by one in every way so well qualified for the enterprise as the author. It is also fortunate that the presentation of two such masters of expression as James

and Bergson does not subject the reader to painful contrasts between the style of the treatment and that of the material treated.

The basis for the entire discussion of the relation of James and Bergson to each other is found in their relation to what Dr. Kallen calls the "philosophical tradition," or better the "metaphysical tradition" in philosophy. In its most general character this tradition has expressed itself in the "compensatory" conception of the world. My recollection is that this term is of Dr. Kallen's own mintage. By it he means that metaphysics has consisted in the main of "a substitution of desiderates for data, of ideals for facts." It has been essentially "a vicarious fulfillment of unsatisfied desire, a compensation in discussion for a disappointment in reality." In method the metaphysic tradition is marked by "the hypostasis of the instrument." "Philosophy has fallen into the position of the toper whose first drink is taken to save his life and who ever after lives to drink."

In computing the latitude and longitude of James and Bergson in relation to this "metaphysical tradition" the author is led to canvass the relation of idealism and radical empiricism, neo-realism and pragmatism to this conception. The author's verdict in the end is that all have sinned and come short of the glory of the God of things as they are; but that James, pragmatism, and radical empiricism—one gathers that the last is the designatory legend preferred by the author—have at all events accepted in principle the world at its "face value" and have in fact been fairly successful in so taking it. Traditional idealism is, of course, *durch und durch* compensatory. Neo-realism has tried to be radically empirical. "But by using formal logic and external relations as a measure of existence it has secured an unchallenged place among the protagonists of the compensatory tradition." Even some pragmatists, *e.g.*, Papini, have not escaped "hypostasizing the instrument." As for Bergson, he is a prince of the compensatorists albeit he finds his compensatory reality in change instead of in eternal visions.

It is in the exposition of the agreement and disagreement, especially of the disagreement, between James and Bergson that the volume makes perhaps its most valuable contribution to current discussion. As before remarked, James' fervid introduction of Bergson misled many. Even in their anti-intellectualism, which is the one thing most readers would say James and

Bergson have in common, Dr. Kallen points out a fundamental difference. Bergson teaches that intellection is essentially mutilative. James says it is so *only* when the results of its operation are hypostasized into metaphysical entities. "For James, falsification belongs to metaphysics; for Bergson, to the realm of cognition as such."

But after all the real basis of philosophic difference between men is to be found not so much in doctrines of method as in beliefs about such matters as "the origin and destiny of man," the nature and meaning of goodness and divinity. And here the chasm between James and Bergson yawns wider than ever. For Bergson, goodness and immortality are metaphysical implications; for James, the one must be created, the other discovered or perhaps also achieved if so be.

As an avowedly sympathetic reader of this volume I find in my notes the following questions on some points of doctrine:

First, is there danger of pushing too far the opposition between man and the world? (pp. 2, 207). While there is opposition, is there not also co-operation?

Second, must not radical empiricists be careful to keep mediation and stability, that is, whatever mediation and stability is found or effected, on a level with the immediacy and the flux of experience? (p. 27 *et passim*.)

Third, I have not been able to see the internal coherence in Bergson's system—for paradoxical enough it is a system—which Dr. Kallen finds (pp. 112, 210 ff.). I have pointed out elsewhere (*Phil. Rev.*, 21, No. 4) that Bergson's attempt to expound an evolutionary philosophy with a nonevolutional logic produces a series of antinomies in which every important category plays opposite and from Bergson's standpoint contradictory rôles.

All in all the verdict must be that Dr. Kallen has done well something well worth doing.

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RELIGIO DOCTORIS: Meditations upon Life and Thought. By A Retired College President. With an introduction by G. Stanley Hall. Boston: Richard Badger, 1913. Pp. vii, 183.

A "human document" is seldom merely interesting, it is usually coercive in its attraction. This is exemplified in the general preference for autobiography to biography, when the former is